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Two distinctly different kinds of Chinese activities occur in the mining sector of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC): state-led, large-scale investment fi nanced by China Export-Import 
(EXIM) Bank; and private investment in mineral processing, trading and, to an extent, mining.1 
While the minerals that interest the various Chinese actors are mostly located in the DRC’s min-
eral-rich south-eastern Katanga province,2 the nature of Chinese engagement differs greatly 
between the two categories. This policy brief seeks to outline these two strands of engagement 
and to discuss the different Chinese actors’ commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR).  
The questions that this policy brief seeks to answer are:
●  To what extent are Chinese fi rms active in the DRC’s mining sector committed to initiating 
and completing CSR activities? 
●  What are the implications of this for the sustainable development of the DRC’s Katanga 
province?
●  What measures can be undertaken to improve the situation?
Defi ning CSR
The current Congolese legal framework requires 
companies investing in the country to initi-
ate and fulfi l CSR activities. Article 69:g of the 
Congolese mining code requires that, in order for 
an investor to apply for an exploitation licence, 
the investor has to submit “[a] plan as to how 
the project will contribute to the development 
of the surrounding communities.”3 The legal 
framework is thus in place, however, general 
implementation of the Congolese legal frame-
work is weak and the legislation on CSR is no 
exception. 
Thus, in a country such as the DRC where 
public functions to distribute the welfare gener-
ated by tax income have largely broken down after 
decades of mismanagement and neglect, where 
poverty is rife, governance weak and workers 
therefore vulnerable to abuse, 4 there is no doubt 
that any corporate entity has a moral obligation 
to engage in “actions that appear to further […] 
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social good, beyond the interests of the fi rm and 
that which is required by law.”5 
For this brief, CSR is defi ned as corporate enti-
ties engaging in activities aiming to further “gov-
ernance, environmental management, stakeholder 
engagement, labour standards, employee and 
community relations […].”6
State-led Chinese investment: 
the Sicomines barter deal
In terms of state-led, large-scale investment fi -
nanced by concessional fi nance provided by EXIM 
Bank, there has been one major agreement: the 
Sicomines barter deal, signed on 22 April 2008. 
The value of the agreement was initially an-
nounced to be US$ 9 billion, however, after the re-
visions made in August 2009, the agreement will 
now bring the DRC US$ 6 billion worth of trans-
port-, social- and mining infrastructure. In ex-
change, Sicomines, a 32/68 joint venture between 
the Congolese mining parastatal Gécamines and 
a Chinese consortium comprising China Railway 
Engineering Corporation (CREC) and Sinohydro, 
has been allocated mining concessions in Katanga 
province encompassing 10.6 million tons of cop-
per and 626,619 tons of cobalt.7 However, it is an-
ticipated that extractive activities at the allocated 
concessions will commence only in 2013, and it is, 
therefore, not yet possible to evaluate Sicomines’ 
CSR practices in terms of its mining activities.8 As 
a result, this brief’s analysis focuses on the exist-
ing private Chinese entities operating in the DRC’s 
Katanga province. 
Private Chinese investment: 
mineral processing and trading
There is a great deal of private smaller-scale 
Chinese investment in the DRC’s mining sec-
tor. Generally, they not receive support from the 
Chinese government or from Chinese policy banks, 
a reality which stands in sharp contrast to the 
general perception of Chinese companies operat-
ing in Africa.9 
Prior to the global economic downturn, a total 
of around 5,000 Chinese entrepreneurs and work-
ers resided in Lubumbashi, capital of Katanga 
province, as well as in neighbouring Likasi and 
Kolwezi. The vast majority of these private ac-
tors operated processing plants for copper and 
cobalt, or comptoirs, trading houses where Chinese 
entrepreneurs acted as brokers, purchasing ore 
from Congolese middle men and selling it on to 
Chinese-owned and other processing plants. While 
the exact number of processing companies ran by 
Chinese nationals at the time is not known, esti-
mations range up to 70 companies.10
The global economic downturn proved these 
Chinese operations to be highly economically 
vulnerable. In December 2008, merely fi ve of the 
Chinese processing companies in the Katanga 
province were still operating. Currently, only 
around 1,000 or fewer Chinese nationals remain 
in Lubumbashi. Operations have, however, slowly 
begun to recover, with several Chinese processing 
plants resuming operations on a small scale.11 
Katanga province is known to be a challeng-
ing environment to live and operate in. Among 
the local Congolese communities and the expatri-
ate Chinese working in Lubumbashi, Likasi and 
Kolwezi, a pattern which could be described as 
‘parallel victim mentalities’ has been identifi ed. 
On the one hand, the Chinese community perceive 
that they as economic actors are highly vulnerable 
in the opaque Congolese operating environment. 
Many of the Chinese entrepreneurs in Katanga’s 
mining sector have argued that they are subject to 
a great deal of harassment from corrupt Congolese 
government representatives and to abuse from 
local criminal elements.12 On the other hand, the 
Chinese private companies operating in Katanga 
are often perceived by the local population as 
‘rough capitalists’ who exploit their Congolese em-
ployees. The latter perception is discussed in the 
following section.
CSR practice of Chinese fi rms 
in the DRC’s mining sector
Chinese-owned fi rms operating in Katanga em-
ploy both local Congolese workers and expatri-
ate Chinese workers. Working conditions differ 
between the two groups, as the Chinese workers 
are generally paid more and provided with accom-
modation. It has been noted that “[e]ven if, by 
Western standards, the conditions for Chinese ex-
patriate staff are tough, they are distinctly supe-
rior to those of the Congolese workers.”13 Working 
conditions for the latter are often perceived as 
substandard. In a survey carried out in 2008 
and 2009 by the NGO Rights & Accountability 
in Development (RAID), examining primarily re-
muneration, job security, freedom of association, 
health, safety, and social benefi ts, “[o]nly a few 
respondents had anything positive to say about 
conditions in Chinese companies.”14 This fi nding 
is supported by fi eld research carried out by the 
Congolese NGO Action Contre l’Impunité pour les 
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Droits Humains (Action against impunity for hu-
man rights, ACIDH).15
Direct criminal acts committed by Chinese em-
ployers on Congolese workers have also been re-
ported, such as physical abuse of Congolese work-
ers at the hands of representatives for the Chinese 
companies and the non-payment of hospital bills 
of Congolese workers having sustained injuries 
at work.16 In the fi rst half of 2008, 15 of 22 com-
plaints lodged with the Congolese NGO ACIDH per-
tained to Chinese companies and largely regarded 
issues such as workplace accidents, outstanding 
indemnities for injured workers, and illegal re-
trenchments of workers involved in trade union 
activities.17 Moreover, child labour is an issue in 
terms of which much criticism has been directed 
towards Chinese companies, as the latter purchase 
ore from groups of artisanal miners often includ-
ing children.18
In terms of environmental management, no 
particular initiative has been noted on the side of 
the Chinese companies. Whereas comprehensive 
data is not yet available on this matter, it has been 
suggested that the Chinese fi rms operating in the 
DRC’s mining sector have neither completed the 
required environmental impact assessments, nor 
the mandatory environmental management plans 
for mining projects, as stipulated in article 15 of 
the Congolese mining code.19 It has further been 
suggested that Chinese companies do not respect 
regulatory requirements pertaining to the storage, 
transport and sales of mineral products.20
In terms of governance, it has been noted that 
in the complex environment of Katanga, “Chinese 
companies are both the benefi ciaries and victims 
of this system.”21 While Chinese company rep-
resentatives have expressed their despair at the 
harassment directed against them by corrupt lo-
cal government offi cials, discontent has also been 
expressed by Congolese workers and civil society 
representatives over Chinese company representa-
tives’ habit of paying bribes to ‘get out of situa-
tions,’ since this is seen to exacerbate the problem. 
RAID notes that “Congolese workers spoke about 
complicity between the Congolese authorities and 
Chinese companies, and denounced the wide-
spread practice among Chinese managers of brib-
ing labour inspection agents, security services and 
members of the judiciary as a means of settling 
labour disputes to their own advantage.”22
Language barriers are widely identifi ed as 
a challenge in terms of the Chinese companies’ 
relations with their Congolese employees and lo-
cal community stakeholders at large. Residential 
segregation and communication problems are 
found to be mutually reinforcing factors in this 
regard. Chinese workers and managers do not 
feel safe in the Congolese environment and, 
therefore, hardly leave the compound where they 
are accommodated, which means that they have 
limited exposure to local languages and culture.23 
Moreover, Chinese company representatives are 
often perceived as highly unwilling to engage in 
dialogue with Congolese stakeholders such as 
trade union- and community representatives.24 
This is probably a result of four main factors: lan-
guage barriers, cultural differences, experience of 
corrupt practices among Congolese government 
representatives making the Chinese stakeholders 
wary of unnecessary engagement, and attempts to 
avoid the costly implementation of improvement of 
working conditions and other CSR initiatives.
Discussion
A notion often echoed in discussions around CSR 
and Chinese companies’ activities in Africa is that 
‘it is not reasonable to expect that Chinese compa-
nies should come to Africa and start implement-
ing better standards than they are used to from 
home.’ While such claims have no moral legiti-
macy - commercial actors cannot be exonerated 
from the consequences of their actions - the notion 
defi nitely holds explanatory power in terms of 
the CSR performance of Chinese operations in the 
DRC’s mining sector. 
Representatives from the Chinese companies in 
question, particularly the larger operations, have 
stated in interviews that they indeed seek to re-
spect local Congolese labour- and other regulations 
as best as they can given the opaque operating en-
vironment.25 However, engaging in CSR activities 
may not be perceived as a necessity by Chinese 
company owners and managers. It has been noted 
that “[u]nlike their Western counterparts, many 
Chinese managers arriving in the Congo are used 
to witnessing the hardships of migrant workers in 
China’s cities […]. [T]hey appear to take a fatalis-
tic view of the problems in Katanga, which may 
in part explain why they do not take action them-
selves to prevent abuses […].”26 Indeed, Chinese 
company representatives interviewed have argued 
that they do not see the need to invest in local 
communities “because it is unlikely that any ad-
ditional revenue would be used to rehabilitate 
Congo’s dilapidated infrastructure.”27
Thus, part of the reason why CSR perfor-
mance is poor in many of the Chinese operations 
in Katanga is probably that the Chinese owners 
and managers simply do not see the need to fur-
ther improve working conditions or contribute to 
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community development. This being said, they are 
most certainly aware that local legal requirements 
have to be fulfi lled. The given outlined evidence 
shows that legal obligations are commonly over-
looked, and it is, therefore, apparent that inten-
tional neglect also plays a role here. Such acts are 
more likely to occur in an environment such as the 
DRC where law enforcement is generally poor, and 
the deliberate disregard by corporate entities of 
their responsibilities towards their employees, the 
local community and the environment is not often 
followed up with legal action. 
When seeking to understand and counter this 
challenge, it is imperative to deconstruct and con-
textualise the notion ‘Chinese.’ It should be born 
in mind that the Chinese companies responsible 
for the actions outlined here are not Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Instead, the Chinese 
fi rms in question are private commercial actors 
with little or no connection to, or support from 
the Chinese government and the Chinese Embassy 
in Kinshasa.28 It can also be noted that there are 
differences within the group of Chinese companies 
operating in Katanga. Medium and large Chinese 
companies with a long-term strategy for their pres-
ence in the DRC are more likely to be open to CSR 
issues, whilst micro- and small sized companies, 
not intending to establish sustainable operations, 
seem to be more inclined to set things up quickly 
and at the lowest possible cost.29
Conclusion
This policy brief paints a picture of Chinese-
owned corporate entities that, far from initiating 
and completing CSR activities, barely fulfi l the 
legal requirements imposed by the Congolese host 
government. It can, therefore, be concluded that 
CSR performance of Chinese companies currently 
active in the DRC’s mining sector is, according to 
the data available at present, not satisfactory. If 
these practices continue unchanged, the private 
Chinese investments in question are not likely 
to contribute to sustainable development of the 
DRC’s mineral-rich Katanga province.
While it must be recognised that the gover-
nance situation in Katanga is challenging for in-
vestors and diffi cult for foreign actors to change, 
it is also important to acknowledge the role that 
overseas companies play in terms of perpetuat-
ing such patterns. Efforts from both Chinese and 
Congolese stakeholders will, therefore, be needed 
in order to come to terms with the situation.
Notably, the Chinese Embassy in Kinshasa 
should become more active as a liaison between 
Congolese local government representatives and 
the Chinese companies in question. In order to 
safeguard China’s standing as a responsible inter-
national actor, it should be in the Chinese govern-
ment’s interest to engage with the Chinese expa-
triate business community in the DRC to address 
concerns raised by the local population and local 
civil society. 
It is also imperative to improve communication 
on a local level between Congolese and Chinese 
stakeholders. For example, Congolese graduates 
from Chinese universities could, upon graduation, 
be engaged by Congolese authorities as well as 
Congolese and international civil society organi-
sations to bridge the language barrier and engage 
with Chinese company representatives on issues of 
CSR. The recently established Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce in Lubumbashi could be an appropriate 
starting point in terms of such engagement.30
Most important, however, is to improve the 
adherence to local Congolese legal frameworks 
among both Congolese local government represen-
tatives and Chinese economic actors. While it is 
acknowledged that this is easier said than done in 
this context, the corrupt practices outlined in this 
brief must cease to benefi t the wellbeing of the lo-
cal population. 
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